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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Timothy Scott, who was found guilty by a jury of being a 
former felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 922(g), appeals, complaining of the District Court's 
denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, of certain 
evidentiary rulings, and of the court's allowance of a 
government witness's redirect examination. 
 
II. 
 
Scott was arrested on April 13, 1997 by New Jersey 
police officers Eugene Kennedy and Eric Ingold who found 
him near the scene of a disturbance in possession of a 
loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun.1 Scott was 
then taken to the police station for processing, during 
which he was directed to remove certain articles of clothing. 
At that time, Scott made several statements to the effect of: 
"why are you trying to put this on me, I didn't have no 
gun." App. at 593-94. Indeed, whether Scott had afirearm 
or ammunition within S 922(g) was the principal contested 
issue in the case. While Scott was removing his right boot 
at the police station, a .45 caliber bullet fell to the floor, 
and in response Scott blurted out "Oh, shit." Thereafter, 
Scott ceased denying having possessed the weapon. App. at 
591-95. 
 
Scott was indicted by a federal grand jury for violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 922(g).2 Scott stipulated at trial that he was a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We view the evidence in favor of the verdict winner, here the 
government. See United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 922(g) provides, in relevant part: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in 
       any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
       exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or 
foreign 
       commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, anyfirearm or 
       ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has 
       been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
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convicted felon and that the weapon and ammunition in 
question was moved in interstate commerce. 
 
On January 21, 1998, the District Court entered an order 
requiring the government to make available any relevant 
written or recorded statements or confessions made by 
Scott. The government represented in a pre-trial brief filed 
in June 1998 that it did not possess any such statements 
made in response to interrogation by law enforcement 
officers. Shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin, the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney discovered and disclosed notes of 
his predecessor regarding the "Oh, shit" remark. Scott filed 
a motion to suppress the statements he made during 
processing denying he had been carrying a gun and the 
"Oh, shit" remark that he made when the bullet fell out of 
his boot. Scott contended that the delayed disclosure of the 
post-arrest statements constituted a violation of the 
discovery order and Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A). The District 
Court held a suppression hearing and thereafter denied the 
motion to suppress but ordered a one week continuance to 
allow Scott's counsel time to prepare to address the 
statement. 
 
In the course of trial preparation, Scott secured the 
transfer from a New York prison of Raymond Smith to 
testify on his behalf by use of the ex parte procedure 
provided by Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b). The Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, unfamiliar with Rule 17(b) and its process, 
learned of the presence of Smith, a possible defense witness 
then being housed at the Camden County Jail, and 
requested officers Kennedy and Ingold to interview Smith at 
the jail if he was willing to talk. Smith was and the officers 
interviewed him. Scott filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss 
the indictment on the ground that the interview of Smith 
was a violation of Rule 17(b). The District Court held a 
hearing after which it denied the motion but precluded the 
government from using any information obtained in the 
interview with Smith. Scott's counsel chose not to present 
Smith as a witness. 
 
The matter proceeded to trial. After the defense rested, 
Scott moved to have the government's representations as to 
the absence of any statements made by Scott (which 
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appeared on page 13 of its pre-trial brief) admitted into 
evidence. This motion was denied. 
 
The jury then returned a guilty verdict on the one count 
at issue. The District Court sentenced Scott to 120 months 
imprisonment and 36 months of supervised release. Scott 
filed a timely appeal. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Scott's motion to dismiss the indictment is premised on 
his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We exercise plenary 
review over a district court's legal rulings in declining to 
dismiss an indictment, and we review its factualfindings 
for clear error. See United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 
221, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). Scott contends that the action of 
the prosecutor in sending officers to interrogate prospective 
defense witness Smith amounted to misconduct and was 
prejudicial in that the officers intimidated Smith or 
otherwise caused him to change his story. Scott contends 
that Smith would have testified that Scott was not in 
possession of a gun at the time of his arrest, but that as a 
result of the interrogation Smith was afraid to give such 
testimony. Scott argues that the District Court's ruling 
barring the government from using any information 
acquired from the interrogation of Smith was not adequate 
to avert the chilling and prejudicial effect of the 
interrogation. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b) provides that: 
 
       Defendants Unable to Pay. The court shall order at any 
       time that a subpoena be issued for service on a named 
       witness upon an ex parte application of a defendant 
       upon a satisfactory showing that the defendant is 
       financially unable to pay the fees of the witness and 
       that the presence of the witness is necessary to an 
       adequate defense. If the court orders the subpoena to 
       be issued the costs incurred by the process and the 
       fees of the witness so subpoenaed shall be paid in the 
       same manner in which similar costs and fees are paid 
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       in case of a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the 
       government. 
 
It is well established that the purpose of Rule 17(b) "is to 
`shield the theory of [a] defense from the prosecutor's 
scrutiny.' " United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 980 
(4th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Meriwether, 486 
F.2d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 1973)). The Advisory Committee 
Notes refer to the need for a process by which defendants 
unable to pay the fees of a witness necessary to an 
adequate defense may obtain the issuance of a subpoena 
without disclosing in advance the theory of the defense. 
See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b) advisory committee's note 
to 1966 Amendment. However, even when there has been a 
Rule 17(b) violation the defendant can obtain relief only 
upon a showing "that he was prejudiced by the failure to 
comply with the rule." Meriwether, 486 F.2d at 506. 
 
In the present case, the District Court found that the 
government did in fact violate Rule 17(b) and thereby 
learned something about the defense strategy which it 
would not otherwise have learned. However, the court 
determined that the appropriate cure for such prejudice 
was not dismissing the indictment, as Scott sought, but 
prohibiting the government from using any information 
acquired by way of that violation. 
 
We need not decide whether the government's action 
constituted a violation of Rule 17(b) because, in any event, 
we find no error in the District Court's decision. The court 
relied on ample authority holding that the dismissal of an 
indictment for prosecutorial misconduct is an "extreme 
sanction which should be infrequently utilized." United 
States v. Pabian, 704 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(quotation omitted); see also United States v. Holloway, 778 
F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Owen, 580 
F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978); cf. United States v. McKenzie, 
678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that"even in the 
case of the most `egregious prosecutorial misconduct,' the 
indictment may be dismissed only `upon a showing of 
actual prejudice to the accused' "). 
 
The District Court's findings, which Scott does not 
challenge, make clear that there was no egregious 
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prosecutorial misconduct in this case. Moreover, as the 
court found, inasmuch as Scott did not call Smith to testify 
for "tactical" reasons there was no basis tofind that the 
officers' interrogation of Smith tainted his testimony. App. 
at 283, 290. These findings, combined with the District 
Court's order preventing the prosecution from using any 
information derived from the interview, make clear that 
Scott was not prejudiced by any violation of Rule 17(b). We 
therefore reject Scott's contention that the court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. 
 
B. 
 
Scott's second contention is directed to the District 
Court's admission of certain evidence, a ruling we generally 
review under an abuse of discretion standard although we 
exercise plenary review over the district court's conclusions 
of law. See United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 125 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
Scott's complaint about the admission of certain post- 
arrest statements is based on the requirement of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A) that upon the defendant's request the 
government must disclose to the defendant and make 
available for inspection, copying, or photographing"that 
portion of any written record containing the substance of 
any relevant oral statement made by the defendant . . . in 
response to interrogation by any person then known to the 
defendant to be a government agent . . . ." The District 
Court initially ruled that the government had violated Rule 
16 and the applicable discovery order by negligently 
concealing, until a week before trial, the oral statements 
which Scott made voluntarily while in police custody, and 
also ruled that Scott was prejudiced thereby. To cure that 
prejudice, the court granted a continuance affording 
defense counsel an additional week to prepare for trial. 
 
Neither the "Oh, shit" remark nor the assertions of 
innocence fall within Rule 16. As the court stated in United 
States v. Kusek, 844 F.2d 942, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1988), 
under Rule 16(a)(1)(A) "the government is not required to 
provide discovery of a defendant's unrecorded, spontaneous 
oral statements not made in response to interrogation." The 
 
                                6 
  
District Court here recognized that "the government only 
has to produce statements which are made in response to 
interrogation by a person a defendant knows to be a law 
enforcement officer." App. at 848-49. 
 
The rule is similar elsewhere. For example, in United 
States v. Cooper, 800 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1986), a prisoner 
who had been convicted of assaulting another inmate 
argued on appeal that the district court erred in admitting 
into evidence an incriminating statement he made during 
the assault. That statement, made in response to a 
correctional officer's order to stop the assault, was: "Not 
yet, I'm not finished." Id. at 416. He argued that Rule 
16(a)(1)(A) barred use of the statement as evidence because 
the government did not divulge this statement before trial 
in response to his request. On appeal, the court held that 
the statement was properly admitted, noting that"[f]or an 
oral statement to be within the purview of [the Rule], it 
must be made in response to interrogation." Id. (quotation 
omitted); see also United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 
1399 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that "a defendant's voluntary 
statements made to individuals that the defendant did not 
know were government agents do not come within the 
ambit of this rule"); United States v. Hoffman, 794 F.2d 
1429, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing a suppression 
order where the discovery order exceeded the parameters of 
Rule 16(a)(1)(A) in that it compelled disclosure of oral 
statements made by the defendant not in response to 
interrogation). 
 
Indeed, shortly after its ruling the District Court here 
recognized that its order went beyond the parameters of 
Rule 16. On December 7, 1998, in addressing Scott's 
application to have page 13 of the government's pre-trial 
brief admitted into evidence, the court stated:"I believe I 
may have erred in the sense that I held there was a 
violation of the discovery order since the discovery order in 
this case goes beyond the language of Rule 16 . . . ." App. 
at 848. 
 
Because we conclude that the statements in question did 
not violate Rule 16 as they were not made in response to 
interrogation, the government had no obligation to disclose 
them. It follows that the one-week continuance granted by 
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the District Court, albeit unnecessary, was not an abuse of 
discretion. Furthermore, because Scott sought to admit 
page 13 of the government's pretrial brief to contradict the 
government's earlier statement that it was not in 
possession of any Rule 16(a)(1)(A) material, and we have 
determined that that response was accurate, we reject 
Scott's contention that the District Court erred in failing to 
admit page 13. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, Scott contends that the District Court erred in 
allowing questioning on redirect examination of Officer 
Ingold. Scott failed to object to this examination at trial, 
and therefore can secure relief only if the alleged errors are 
plain error. See United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 204 
(3d Cir. 1988). We see no error, much less plain error. The 
redirect examination was directed to matters about which 
Officer Ingold had testified on cross-examination, and 
which he sought to explain on redirect examination. This is 
the classic purpose of redirect examination. 
 
IV. 
 
In light of the above, we will affirm Scott's conviction and 
sentence. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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